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A READER'S GUIDE TO THE PROPOSED CHANGES
IN THE PRECLUSION PROVISIONS OF THE
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS
Robert T. Brousseau*
[Tjhe first undertaking of the new organization should be to produce a restatement of certain phases of the law that would tell
judges and lawyers what the law was. Such a work would dispel
uncertainty in the fields of law it dealt with if it had 'an authority
greater than that now accorded any legal treatise, an authority
more nearly on a par with that accorded the decision of the courts.'
A judge, a lawyer, a law teacher could then go to one source, find
what the law in point was and with confidence note it to be so.1
Nearly thirty-five years have passed since the promulgation in 1942
of the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law of Judgments,
an altogether remarkable work hammered and forged in the short span
of two years. None should feign surprise, however, if the subject's
authority suffered with its age, for the active life of a legal text like that
of an athlete is necessarily short. Two factors have required a review of the Restatement of this subject as it bears upon preclusion by
judgment, factors which command mention at least for their obviousness: the widespread adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
as a model for state systems of civil procedure, 2 and the frontal attacks
on the "rules" of mutuality and privity conducted in the van by the
Supreme Court of California3 and belatedly given the dignity of nation* B.S.F.S., Georgetown University; J.D., Duke University. Assistant Professor of
Law, Mercer University.
1. H. GOODRICH AND P. WOLImN, THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN LAW iNsITiruE
1923-1961 8 (1961).
2. FED. R. Civ. P., 28 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1975) (historical materials).
3. Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
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wide application by a narrow yet portentous holding of the federal
Supreme Court. 4 What follows is at best a restatement of a restatement,
an attempt to compress into a few pages the extraordinary efforts and
conscientious research of the American Law Institute, both the product
of and the happy answer to a system of law operating in a vast and never
simple federal union.
The sequence of discussion is not always that of the Institute, but
lends itself to the more narrative tone suitable for periodical literature.
Where criticism appears warranted, I have with deference but without
hesitation inserted it.
A PRELIMINARY COMMENT WITH A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY
With respect to nomenclature the American Law Institute has done
nothing to dispel the fog which settles in the first year of law school and
seems never to ascend for most of us. Both the First5 and Second'
Restatements define "res judicata" to include the preclusive effect given
a judgment as a merger, a bar, or a collateral or direct estoppel.
Engaging in further taxonomy, the drafters of the Second Restatement
distinguish between "issue preclusion" (collateral and direct estoppels)
and "claim preclusion"' 7 (merger and bar), a thoroughly more useful
and traditional division and one which corresponds to the more popular
understanding of the subject." But insofar as a term of general application is needed, the appropriation of "res judicata" for the purpose is
harmless enough. In the ensuing discussion, I have limited myself to
the most traditional form of civil suit in which the question of preclusion
is most likely to arise: the in personam action seeking affirmative relief.0
FINALITY OF JUDGMENTS

It is hornbook law that a judgment is entitled to res judicata effect
only if final, and in this maxim there is no change between the two
4. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S.
313 (1971).
5. RESTATEMENT OF JuDrmENTs, Ch. 3, Introductory Note (1942). The earlier
work will hereinafter be cited as FrST RESTATEMENT.
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUrMENTs, Ch. 3, Introductory Note (Tent. Draft
No. 1, 1973). The first Tentative Draft will hereinafter be cited SECOND RESTATEMENT.
7. See SECOND RESTATEmENT § 41, especially Comment g.
8. "Res judicata" customarily includes only the effects of merger and bar, in opposition to estoppel by judgment, which is seen as a corollary, but distinct, doctrine.
9. For the treatment of actions in rem and quasi in rem as well as those initiated
by obtention of jurisdiction over status, see SECOND REsrATEMENT §§ 73-75, and for
declaratory judgments, § 76 of the same draft.
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Restatements. Nonetheless, one cannot at all infer from the similarity
of language that the area of finality has been stagnant these many years.
In 1942, the position of the Institute was that "[o]rdinarily the requirement of finality of judgment as a basis for appellate proceedings is
the same as that of finality as a basis for the application of the rules of
res judicata,"' 1 a position it now disingenuously asserts "has often been
suggested" but which "has probably never been quite true."'" As to
merger and bar, a strict-and coincidentally traditional-view of finality
is appropriate, since these claim preclusions operate to "extinguish" a
party's claim. Whatever considerations may favor relaxation of the
requirement of finality for purposes of appellate review-mainly preservation of the integrity of the trial process and encouragement of judicial
economy-are not easily transported to the extinguishment of a constellation of rights in a party. The drafters of the recent Restatement
recognize this and caution against a too easy confusion of finality under
such appeals statutes as section 129112 with finality for claim preclusion.
They suggest, however, that the more flexible concept of finality
adopted by the federal courts-that "final" in some instances means
"final enough"' 8-may be appropriate for issue preclusion, and the
illustrations they supply lend cogent support.' 4 It is theoretically a trifle
troublesome to discern how one can be collaterally estopped by a
judgment-and both Restatements are emphatic that the metaphysical
underpinning of direct and collateral issue preclusion is an estoppel by
judgmentA---which has not been, may or may not be, rendered. This
theoretical peccadillo may stem from an excestion in both Restatements
which allows application of full res judicata effect to intermediate
judgments which do not ultimately settle or terminate the litigation.' 6
10. FmsT RESTATEmENT § 41, Comment a.
11. SECOND RESTATE mNT § 41, Comment b.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970), discussed in SEcoND REsTATEMENT § 41, Comment

b.,

13. Most of the cases arise under 28 U.S.C. H9 1291, 1292, 1257 (1970). Similar
problems exist under FED. R. Civ. P. 56(d), the misleadingly called "partial summary
judgment" rule. I say misleading, since without a determination of appealability under
FED. R. Crv. P. 54(b) there is no judgment (and accordingly) no finality. See text accompanying note 15 infra for the theoretical problems attendant upon preclusion without
judgment.
14. SEcoND RESTATEMENT § 41, Illustrations 1-3.

15. Compare FST RESTATEMENT § 45, comment on clause (c) with the parallel

comment in the SECOND RESATEMENT.
16. Compare Fmsr REsTATEMENT §

14, Comment c with SECOND R STATEmENT §
41, Comment e. There is a common emphasis on adjudications in bankruptcy, accounting and receiverships, but the SEcoNDRFRsTATEmNT specifically refers to the broadly
applicable FED. R. Cv. P. § 54(b).
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But in those instances at least one has a judgment. The matter is of
measurably greater importance in these days since 1938 and 1966 of
-liberal claims and party joinder, when protracted litigation of impressive
life expectancy may yet involve early adjudication of issues crucial in
other contemplated or pending suits. This raises the spectre of inconsistent judgments in numbers greater than before,' 7 but blame for that,
should blame be due, is laid more properly at the door of the apostles of
liberal joinder than at that of those who merely accommodate them.
Modifiable judgments or those granting or denying continuing
relief, a not inconsiderable portion of the civil judicial output, are
treated only tangentially in the First Restatement, 8 but receive comprehensive attention in the Second.' 9 The 1973 draft, as a general rule,
would allow preclusive effect to judgments granting or denying continuing relief so long as the circumstances underlying the judgment remain
unchanged. There then being no reason for the first court to modify its
judgment, a sort of static finality exists which should trigger preclusion
in a second suit. While the 1973 comment addresses its loudest voice to
merger and bar, it specifically includes issue preclusion by modifiable
judgment, an altogether sensible extension if the other requirements of
estoppel are met,20 since it is changed facts which usually open a
modifiable judgment. 2 ' Once actually determined, the facts and issues
ought not be relitigated elsewhere if no changed circumstances move the
first court to reexamine them.
A major change effected by the Second Restatement if adopted will
be the effect of proceedings to set aside or vacate a judgment on that
judgment's preclusive force. Both Restatements share the view that the
mere existence of unelapsed time in which such proceedings might be
brought does not prevent the judgment's use preclusively.22 They also
concur in the notion that a motion in the trial court, whether for
vacation, modification, or new trial, does not impair the binding force of
17. As to inconsistent judgments, see text accompanying note 26 infra.

18. See FIRST REsTATEmENT § 41, Comment a. The comment allows an action
upon a judgment to recover alimony installment payments which have become due. It
is hard to extrapolate any general rule from this, since such a judgment is without question final. The FIRST RESTATEMENT apparently does not consider modifiable judgments
final and hence accords them no res judicata effect.
19. See SECOND RESTATEMENT § 41, Comment c.
20. See generally SECOND RESTATEMENT § 68.
21. There is authority that changes in the law may also render continuing judgments
modifiable. See cases cited in SECOND RESTATEMENT § 41, Reporter's Note to Comment
C.

22. Compare FIRST RESTATEMENT § 41, Comment d with SECOND RESTATEMENT

§

41, Comment f.
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the judgment; the Second Restatement is even more emphatic in specifically rejecting statutes or rules of court which make such judgments

23
unenforceable pending determination of the motion in the trial court.

Where the two redactions part ways is in the appellate court: what
preclusive effect can be given a judgment which has been taken for
review to a higher court? The First Restatement looked to whether
such proceedings under local law operated to vacate the judgment, as
was the case with respect to decrees appealed in equity, but not generally
with respect to judgments under writ of error. The Second Restatement
takes the view that taking of an appeal does not affect finality-and
hence preclusion-unless the "appeal" is in actuality a trial de novo.
Finality is not affected by the character ascribed to review by local law,
in all a worthy change made almost irresistible by the procedural merger
of law and equity. Res judicata is difficult enough without having its
applicability turn on medieval distinctions, largely repudiated.24
In carrying out the newer section 41's suggestion that the concept
of finality may be less stringently applied in cases of issue preclusion
than in instances of claim preclusion, the Second Restatement2 5 sketches

the following tests: (1) the parties were fully heard, (2) the court
supported its decision with a reasoned opinion, (3) the decision was
subject to appeal or was in fact reviewed on appeal, and (4) the
decision was not avowedly tentative. Again we have opened wider the
door for inconsistent adjudications since we have broadened the availability of prior decisions as "judgments" upon which to ground subsequent decisions.
INCONSISTENT AND DEPENDENT JUDGMENTS

In the first of the two situations in the caption, no significant

change has occurred: the well-settled rule is reaffirmed that "[w]hen in
two actions inconsistent final judgments are rendered, it is the later not
the earlier judgment that is accorded conclusive effect in a third action
under the rules of res judicata. '' 26 This is the so-called "last-in-time"

rule, which presents no difficulties and seems equitable enough in the
23. Id.
24. Id. It is odd that the Institute here and in the rule accompanying note 23 supra

counts for naught what must be the clear import of local rules (albeit not their full play)
when in more crucial areas it seems needlessly abject before unnecessarily harsh effects
created by anomalous interactions of local rules or statutes with the general rules of res
judicata. For an example see SECOND RESTATEMENT § 41.3.
25. SECOND RESTATEMENT § 41, Comment g.
26. SE CoND RESTATEMENT § 41.2. CompareFntsT RESTATEMENT § 42.
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case of a party who fails to assert available preclusion in one action yet
demands it in another. The later judgment is valid and subsisting and
ought not be overturned merely because it is inconsistent with an earlier
one. Elements of unfairness steal in, however, where the diligent suitor
in the second action asserts preclusion and it is erroneously refused.
There seems little for it, indeed, but to apply the general rule that valid
judgments should be appealed and not attacked. Problems arise when
the successful second suitor, the beneficiary of the court's erroneous
denial of preclusion, claims preclusion in a later action. Even if the
erroneous denial of preclusion is reversed, according to the
Restatement's view, the dependent judgment will remain majestically
intact.
Let me write out this curious rule, which follows closely the First
Restatement:
A judgment based on an earlier judgment is not nullified automatically by reason of the setting aside, or reversal on appeal, or
other nullification of that earlier judgment; but the later judgment may be set aside, in appropriate proceedings, with
2 7 provision
for any suitable restitution of benefits received under it.
The section follows, blindly I think, the Supreme Court opinion in Reed
v. Alien,28 and has long been the subject of thoroughly persuasive
criticism by Professor Moore. 0 He would simply apply the "last-intime" rule to the nullifying act of the appellate court-which is, to be
sure, a judgment-so that it, and not the erroneous judgment at nisi
prius will be given preclusive effect in a later action. That the Institute
is uncomfortable with its rule is clear from its official comments and
Reporter's Note, which are pointedly apologetic and do not confront the
hardest case. The 1973 revisers proclaim that "the problem when met
head-on is that of a judgment based and dependent upon an earlier
judgment which subsequently is nullified. ' 30 I respectfully dissent: that
is the problem met obliquely, for it is easily circumvented by such
postjudgment relief as that provided in Federal Rule 6031 and under
similar state practice. The problem "met head-on" is the nullification
on appeal of a dominant judgment when there are no longer any
available avenues of postjudgment relief from the earlier dependent
27. SECOND REStATeMENT § 41.3. The earlier language is in FMRST RESTATEMENT
§ 44.
28. 286 U.S. 191 (1932).
29. 1B J. MOORE, FEDmAL PRACTICE 10.41614] (2d ed. 1974).
30. SECOND RESTATEMENT § 41.3, Comment c.
31. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60, especially 60(b)(5) which specifically allows relief on
the basis of a nullified "dominant" judgment.
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judgment. Resort to local procedure seems a rather thin solution, when
the Institute is unable to assure that postjudgment relief is available
from the dependent judgment. 32 It seems a more just solution to allow
what the reporter hopes is allowed-a guaranteed avenue of redress
against the dependent judgment. I should even be willing to permit a
new exception to the general rule against collateral attack of a valid
judgment in any instance where the complaining party can establish his
inability to secure redress in the court which rendered the dependent but
now unsupported judgment. 33 The answer accommodates the arguments of Professor Moore (that judgments based not on litigated issues
but on precluded issues ought to fall with a dominant judgment which is
voided on appeal) with the reluctance of the Institute to disturb the
stability of judgments by permitting anything so unregulated as "automatic" nullification. It seems not unfair to assure the litigant a day in
court on the matters reopened by the reversal of the dominant judgment. 34
CLAIMS AND CAUSES OF ACTIONS

It has long been a cause of embarrassment to teachers of civil
procedure that for the first 90 percent of the course they struggle to
wean the student from the arbitrary and conceptualistic language of
cause of action which permeates the older codes and cases and still
muddles thinking under our current claim-oriented procedure, while in
the closing days of the course-after judgment is rendered-the cause
of action appears as from nowhere to define the operative preclusive
effect of the judgment. It is disquieting. The writers of the Second
Restatement have gone much of the distance to make the subject, if not
32. "Local procedure must be consulted to find the appropriate methods and any
relevant periods of limitation; counterparts to the following methods, available in federal
court, can probably be found in state practice." RESTATEMENT SECOND § 41.3, Reporter's Note, Comment c (emphasis added). The note assumes the federal remedy is always available, when in fact it is limited to "a reasonable time," but I shall not quibble:
Rule 60 preserves "an independent action to relieve a party from judgment" which the
reporter correctly suggests might be appropriate in these cases.
33. This need may well be obviated under other provisions of the First Restatement,
see, e.g., § 125, but I think not.
34. I enter the following caveat. The First Restatement contained language broad
enough to include all forms of res judicata under its section 44 dealing with the subsequently reversed dominant judgment. Illustration 1 involves the truest form of merger,
an action on a favorable judgment, while Illustration 2 involves a second judgment dependent only in the sense that collateral estoppel supplied the defense which resulted
in a favorable judgment for the defendant. The Second Restatement omits the illustrations. I do not infer from the omission any restriction in the type of dependent judgment covered by the section.
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easy, at least in harmony with modem theories of pleading and procedure.
The difference in approach and necessarily in anticipated results
between the two Restatements is marked. The 1942 Introductory Note
engages our attention with a doubtless empirically verifiable yet wholly
misleading generalization: "Ordinarily it is clear whether or not the two
actions are based on the same cause of action."35 The later reporter has
assumed the more forthright posture, observing that for the purposes of
determining claim preclusion, it "becomes necessary to determine
what is the scope or extent or dimension of the claim that has been
extinguished, or, noted in another way, what is the scope of the matter
as to which a second action by the plaintiff against the defendant is
precluded." The key, he asserts, is a "transactional"30 analysis.
With the dethronement of the cause of action as the operative
determinant of the scope of res judicata go all of the7 structure and a
It is replaced
good deal of the substance of the former treatment.
with a lean, tripartite exposition of the general rule,3 8 some exemplifications thereof3 9 and exceptions thereto, 40 interspersed throughout by
comments and illustrations in greater number and detail than we shall
elsewhere see in these two tentative drafts.
The new rule concerning "splitting" a claim-attempting to use
offensively 41 in two actions what should have been used in the first-is a
first cousin of Federal Rule 13(a) concerning compulsory counterclaims: "IThe claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to
remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the
transaction,or series of connected transactions, out of which the action

arose."42 This "transactional" approach and the corollary abandonment of the cause of action, although needing no apology, is justified as
a response to contemporary notions of appropriate trial units. "Transaction," the reporter notes, has always been the outer limit of merger
35. FiRsT RESTATEMENT, Ch. 3, Topic 2, Title D, Introductory Note.
36. The quotation marks are his.
37. FrST RESTATEMENT §§ 61-67.

38.

SECOND RESTATEMENT

§ 61.

39. Id. § 61.1.
40. Id. § 61.2.
41. See text accompanying note 101 infra for the Institute's view of "splitting" a
claim defensively.
42. SECOND REsTATEMENT § 61 (emphasis added). Compare FED. R. Crv. P.
13(a).:
Compulsory Counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim
which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing
party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
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and bar, for a judgment in the prior action could not preclude a second
action on a different transaction. But now, as often happens in law and
life, the maximum becomes the minimum. "The law of res judicata
now reflects the expectation that parties who are given the capacity to
present 'their entire controversies' shall in fact do so."'4 3 What the
modem systems of procedure exemplified by the Federal Rules permit,
the modem law of res judicata exemplified by the Second Restatement
commands. One must be chary, however, of overstating the case, as I
think this Second Restatement does, of too lightly equating Federal
Rules joinder with Restatement preclusion. For all its "transaction" or
"claim" orientation inherited from Charles Edwin Clark,4 4 the Federal
Rules system does not excape the "individual" or "party." The party is
the real unit of division, for the Federal Rules contain no effective
compulsory party joinder, and cleverly limit compulsory claim joinder to
situations where it is unlikely to affect party joinder. True it is that we
have indispensable party rules4 5 which make joinder "compulsory," but
the penalty for nonjoinder is not extinguishment, but dismissal without
prejudice of the plaintiff's claim. 46 Federal Rule 13(a), the compulsory counterclaim rule which is at once the cornerstone and paradigm of
the transactional analysis the Second Restatement attempts to borrow, is
hardly reconcilable with the grand design of making permissive joinder
mandatory through application of res judicata.
Thus the transactional universe which supposedly defines the binding effect of the judgment must at once be redefined into transactional
subsets: the new Restatement admits that if A and B are injured as
passengers in the same automobile, and in the same accident, they
possess separate claims,4 7 although both as a matter of pleading and as a
matter of logic, their rights to redress arise out of the same transaction.
One other point, perhaps a semantic one, suggests that the Federal Rules
drafters had not quite the transactional orientation of claim which the
1973 Restatement authors ascribe to them. Rule 13 commands filing
by a defendant of any "claim" arising "out of the same transaction or
43. SECOND REsTATEMENT § 61, Comment a.
44. See C. CLAPm, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 19 (2d ed. 1947).
Clark was the reporter and chief draftsman of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

45. FED. L Civ. P. 19.
46. FED. R. Crv. P. 41(b) specifically states that an involuntary dismissal for failure to join a party under Rule 19 does not act, unless the court otherwise specifies, as
an adjudication on the merits. The Restatement elsewhere, of course, accommodates
this provision by stating that such a dismissal does not bar a second action on the same
claim. See SEcoND RESTATEmENT § 48.1.

47. See SEcoND RESTATEmENT § 61, Comment a.
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'
occurrence."48
A "transaction" then necessarily encompasses, in the
contemplation of the Rules, several claims even of a single person.
The specific provisions relating to the scope of the claim are of less
immediate importance than this major change of emphasis in the theory
of the claim. Most of the comments and illustrations, and even an
entire section of considerable detail,49 take aim at older formulations of
"cause of action" and in the dreams of the reporter lay them forevermore to rest. The plaintiffs claim is extinguished by judgment even
though he is prepared in a second action to present different evidence,
grounds or theories, or to seek distinct remedies or forms of relief than
those sought in the first action. The rule against splitting thus places on
the plaintiff the same onus as has long been shouldered by the defendant
who must defend on every ground and theory and with whatever
evidence: he cannot pick and choose and hope to have another day 0
One of the interesting effects of this is to place the responsibility for
variances in the pleadings51 on the plaintiff, where arguably it belongs if
it must belong somewhere: the doctrine of variances combines a singular
degree of inutility and odiousness, and, within modem systems of procedure permitting liberal amendment,5 2 ought only in the most egregious
cases appear.
This requirement that the plaintiff assert his right to relief on the
transaction completely and immediately will have some immediate repercussion for the practitioner. Until now, I do not think the doctrine
of pendent jurisdiction, most definitely articulated in United Mine
5
Workers v. GibbsP-that
in some instances a federal court may adjudicate a "pendent" state claim over which it would otherwise have no
jurisdiction, if the state claim arose out of the same nucleus of operative
fact---much concerned the federal court practitioner, for it seemed to
48. See note 42 supra. The same formula appears in Federal Rule 13(g) concerning cross-claims and in Rule 14(a) concerning third-party practice. Here, of course, the
joinder is permissive and the "transaction" serves its ancient function as a maximal
perimeter.
49. SEcoND RESTATEMENT § 61.1.
50. Id. See SEcoND RESTATEMENT § 47(b) for the proposition that a defendant
may not interpose as a defense to an action on the judgment a defense he might have
raised in the prior action. In a subsequent action not on the judgment, a defense can
be precluded by collateral estoppel; see text accompanying notes 106-53 infra.
51. In capsule form, a variance occurs when proof is introduced as to issues not
joined in the pleadings. Under a strict application of the rule, a dismissal for failure
of proof may result since plaintiff cannot prove his case as pleaded.
52. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a) and especially 15(b) which directly confronts,
and effectively neutralizes, the problem of variances.
53. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
54. As the Reporter's Note indicates, Gibbs used a transactional analysis from
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be but a lever to pry open a few inches more the doors to the federal
chambers. Under the Second Restatement's view, the state and federal
court theories or grounds comprise but a single claim. If there is a
jurisdictional obstacleu5 to asserting both theories in the same state or
federal court, then of course the excluded theory may be pursued in the
appropriate forum. If, however, a federal court might entertain the
state ground or theory in the exercise of its pendent jurisdiction, the
state claim is merged in the judgment whether asserted or not since it is
part of the claim with no jurisdictional obstacles to its determination.
Deductive reasoning supports the conclusion (as well as the converse
where a state court has concurrent jurisdiction to determine federal
claims) 6 but defeats it as well, depending on which of two propositions
is the premise: first, the justification for the determination by the federal
judiciary of a question which, standing by itself, would be beyond the
court's constitutional grant of authority is that there is but a single
"case" (read: transaction) before the court which could be entertained
on the basis of the dominant federal question, in Gibbs an alleged
violation of the Taft-Hartley Act.5 7 Secondly, however, it has long been
the rule that a plaintiff may not intentionally split a cause of action by
unnecessarily bringing a portion in a court of limited jurisdiction.5 s
Hence, at least one problem exists with calling rights created by federal
law and rights existing by virtue of state law but a single claim. I do
not think the Institute sufficiently explains its position on the point,
especially in light of the goals of res judicata and most especially of
bar. 9 Why on earth should a defendant have to litigate this matter
twice? If a state claim is adjudicable in federal court under the doctrine
of pendent jurisdiction, but the plaintiff chooses to bring it in state
court, a not unlikely desire, a judgment will not under the Second
Restatement's view extinguish the federal ground since there is a "juriswhich the Second Restatement borrows heavily. See SECOND REsTATEmENT § 61.1, Reporter's Note. In fact, in the same place, in Comment c, discussing the thoroughly
factual character of claim, the Reporter virtually restates the famous formulation from
Gibbs. See 383 U.S. at 725 (1966).
55. See SEcoND RESTATEMENT § 61.1, Comment e.
56. See SECOND RESTATEmmNT § 61.1, Illustration 11.
57. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). The Taft-Hartley Act
provision involved was section 303, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1964).
58. Compare FnsRT RFSTATEmENT § 62, Comment j with SECOND REsTATEMENT §
61, Comment g.
59. See SECOND RESTATEMENT § 48, Comment a:
The rule that a defendant's judgment acts as a bar to a second action on
the same claim is based largely on the ground that fairness to the defendant,
and sound judicial administration, require that at some point litigation over
the particular controversy come to an end.
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dictional obstacle" to the state court's determination of the federal claim.
This permits a plaintiff to play with federalism a game both versions of
the Restatement forbid him otherwise to play: deliberately splitting his
claim by initially suing in a court which has jurisdiction over only a part
of the claim when a court exists which is competent to hear the whole.
On the facts of Gibbs itself the discrepancy would not arise, since the
federal ground of relief, a damage action under section 303 of the TaftHartley Act, is within the concurrent jurisdiction of state and federal
courts.6 0 That the problem could arise, however, is not unlikely. A
deterrent to abuse, always an inferior nostrum to removing the possibility of abuse, is the threat of issue preclusion,0 ' which, we shall see, is free
of many of the impedimenta of claim preclusion.
There are other changes wrought by the 1973 version of perhaps
lesser importance. The curious former section 65,62 whose import I
think never could be ascertained from its language, goes for the most
part out the window, since the Second Restatement's undergirding supposition is a Federal Rule system of procedure which abolishes forms of
actions,6 3 fuses law and equity,64 and permits alternative and even
inconsistent allegations. 65
Former section 65(2) was reluctantly dismissed, however, for it
permitted a second action for restitutionary relief where a plaintiff
erroneously pleaded the existence and breach of a contract but could not
at trial prove it because of an interposed but disfavored defense such as
the statute of limitations or the statute of frauds. 6 The exception was
never quite logical since the two counts, that is, on the breach and for
restitution, might have been pleaded in the alternative and a judgment
would have precluded further assertion of either.67 The Second Re60. 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1970).
61. This is suggested as the proper course in the Reporter's Note to SECOND RE.
STATEmENT § 61.2, Comment c(1).
62. FirsT RESTATEMENT § 65 states in full:
(1) Where a judgment on the merits is rendered in favor of the defendant
inan action to enforce one of two or more alternative remedies, the plaintiff
cannot thereafter maintain an action to enforce another of the remedies.
(2) Where a judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant because the
plaintiff seeks a form of remedy which is not available to him, the plaintiff is
not precluded from subsequently maintaining an action in which he seeks an
available remedy.
63.

FED. R. Civ. P. 2.

64. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 & 2.
65.

FED.

R. Crv. P. 8(e)(2).

66. See FisT RESTATEMENT § 65, Comment i and Illustrations thereto.
67. FIRST RESTATEMENT § 65, Comment d. The reason is that there would have
been a judgment on the merits rather than a determination of nonavailability of relief.
Remember that damages for breach and restitution, while alternative, are not inconsistent. All of this assumes a system permitting pleading in the alternative.
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statement, while sympathetic to the suitor who has partially performed
under a contract the breach of which he cannot legally establish, expects
him to plead breach and restitution in the same action or suffer extinguishment of the unsought remedy. It suggests the plaintiff, if surprised by a failure of proof, amend under Rule 1568 or a state analogue, or at worst, pray the court to enter judgment against him
without prejudice to seeking restitutionary relief. 69
Other changes which merely follow the trend already apparent of
conforming the concept of claim to the permissibility of transactional
pleading, are quickly summarized. Contrary to prior doctrine, 70 mutually exclusive remedies are merged in a favorable judgment 71 as are
any cumulative remedies to which plaintiff was entitled but which he did
72
not seek.
The last of the three sections on the scope of the claim spells out
seven exceptions to the general rule against splitting, 73 most of which
are neither new nor shocking and some of which are simply counterparts
to situations implicitly exempted in the two sections which developed the
general rule. Only three warrant any extended discussion. Section
61.2(d) permits a split where "[t]he judgment in the first action was
plainly inconsistent with the fair and equitable implementation of a
statutory or constitutional scheme, or it is the sense of the scheme that
the plaintiff should be permitted to split his claim . . . ." This is a
restatement of the celebrated holding of the New York Court of Appeals
in White v. Adler' 4 where a public official charged with enforcing a
regulatory scheme inadvertently split a claim to the huge benefit of one
bank shareholder. The doctrines of merger and bar are, to be sure, for
the benefit of defendants, but their wooden application to the facts of
every case is indeed unwarranted.
The remaining two exceptions departing from prior law are shortly
disposed of: one simply allows a split in a claim in "extraordinary
68. Fm. R. Civ. P. 15. The Reporter notes a denial of leave to amend would be
reviewable on appeal.
69. SEcoNDREsTATEmENT § 61.1, Comment h.
70. FmsT RESTATEMENT § 65, Comment k.
71. SECOND RESTATEMENT § 61.1, Comment k. Mutually exclusive remedies are not
always barred by an unfavorable judgment. See the special circumstances suggested in
the same Comment.

72. This is not a change in the spirit of the law. Compare SECOND

RTATEmENT

§ 61.1, Comment jwith FrST RESTATEmNT § 64, Comment f, where the remedies could
not procedurally be cumulated.
73. SECOND REsTATEMENT § 61.2.

74, 2$9 N.Y. 34, 43 N.E.Zd 798 (1952).
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situations where merger or bar is inappropriate,"7r5 a telling confirmation of Judge Clark's famous statement: "The defense of res judicata is
universally respected, but actually not very well liked."70 And finally,
the 1973 draft takes some of the sting out of the often treacherous
choice a plaintiff who suffers a nuisance must make, allowing him either
to split his claim into successive actions if the nuisance is even arguably
temporary, or to sue for total damages. In case he opts for the latter
course yet fails to prove a "permanent nuisance," he is simply relegated
to successive actions rather than barred. 77
MERGER AND BAR

Proposed changes in the law of merger need not long detain us, as
the drafters, besides conforming the language to the Second Restatement's claim emphasis, have done little save extend the general
rule of merger to all "valid and final personal judgments" rather than
merely those for the recovery of money.78
The general rule of bar-that a valid and final personal judgment
rendered in favor of the defendant bars another action by the plaintiff
on the same claim 79 -has been the subject of extensive revisions, almost
all occasioned by elimination of the earlier formulation that the judgment for defendant must have been "on the merits."' 0 This prescription has been abandoned in light of the trend to regard ever more
judgments as bars: the fundamental bases for the rule of bar are fairness
to the defendant and sound judicial administration, considerations
which may frequently conjoin in the absence of any adjudication, or
even litigation, on the merits.81
75.

SECOND RESTATEMENT § 61.2(f) & Comment d.
76. Riordan v. Ferguson, 147 F.2d 983, 988 (2d Cir. 1945) (dissenting opinion).
77. SEcoND RESTATEMENT § 61.2(e) & Comment h. For the earlier view see FmsRT
RESTATEmENT § 62, Comment g.
78. The First Restatement apparently indulged fears that sister state actions for recovery other than the payment of money were not entitled to full faith and credit under
the Constitution, and felt compelled by a desire for symmetry to deny preclusion by
merger to the judgment altogether. The entire text of the Second Restatement evinces
a hope that comity will persuade the sister court to honor the earlier judgment by according it preclusive effect even if the Constitution would not mandate its enforcement. See
SECOND RESTATEMENT § 47, especially Comment b, and the Reporter's Note thereon.
Contrast FiRsT RESTATEmENT § 46 and Comment a and § 47, Comment h. New section
47 also includes a clarifying addendum to its subsection (b) which states that "[i]n
an
action upon the judgment, the defendant cannot avail himself of defenses he might have
interposed, or did interpose, in the first action." SECOND RESTATEMENT § 47(b). This
simply makes explicit what was implied in Comment a to former section 47.
79. SECOND RESTATEMENT § 48.
80. FuisT RESTATEMENT § 48.
81. SECOND RESTATEmENT § 48, Comment a.
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319,

The change which will have the most noticeable effect is the
extension of the general rule of bar to a judgment in favor of defendant
on demurrer or on motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The
1942 Restatement bars further action only if the judgment was rendered
because of an entire failure to state a cause of action.8 2 The change in
position is warranted by the ease of amendment under modem systems
of procedure, exemplified by Federal Rule 15: the plaintiff, faced with
the possibility of dismissal for failure to state a claim, can amend. If the
judge denies leave to amend, certainly not the routine, his denial is
reviewable upon appeal. The reversal of the old rule against preclusion
in cases of so-called technical demurrers is also justified by rules of court
or statutes, archetypally Federal Rule 41, adopted in most American
jurisdictions, which make all but a few dismissals presumptively with
prejudice, that is, bars. 83 There is, to be sure, a prayer implicit in the
recommendation of the passage of this section: that liberal and enlightened views of amendment and pleading-over prevail in the courts of the
land.
Federal Rule 41 has further influenced the Institute toward erecting as bars judgments not on the merits: the newer Restatement will bar
further action where judgment has gone against plaintiff for failure to
prosecute, to obey an order of court, or to appear."4 The First Restatement did not treat the question specifically, but it is pellucidly obvious
that the original drafters thought such a dismissal not "on the merits."
Fairness to the defendant and sound judicial economy virtually compel
the newer view or else we let the languid plaintiff profit by his indifference,* or worse, his misdeeds. Lest one overstate the case, there are
constraints, perhaps even constitutional ones, 8 5 on the exercise of this
power, the most effective of which is judicial reluctance to prejudice
litigable issues because of tactical shenanigans.
The regency of Federal Rule 41 falls short of completeness: a
judgment for defendant because of the running of the statute of limita.
tions8 6 does not bar an action in another state where the statute has not
82. Compare SECOND RESTATEMENT § 48, Comment d with FiRsT RESTATEMENT §
50, Comments a, b, & c ("entire failure to state a cause of action").
83. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b) states in pertinent part: "Unless the court in its order
for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not
provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper
venue, or for failure to join a party under Rule 19, operates as an adjudication upon
the merits."
84. SECOND REsTATEm NT § 48, Comment e.
85. See Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322 (1909); Hovey v. Elliott,
167 U.S. 409 (1897).
86. Actually the language of the Comment is considerably broader, but the major
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run, a position carried over from the First Restatement.8 7 The Reporter, I think, is caught in a dilemma: the same reasons which dictate
expansion of the general rule of bar to nonmonetary judgments should
control here.8 8 That a sister state need not always give effect to the
statute of limitation of another state as a matter of constitutionallaw 8 and this seems to be the justification for this exception to the general
rule of bar-does not suggest that it ought not give preclusive effect as a
matter of comity under the law of judgments to a judgment against a
plaintiff who in the first instance brought the untimely action in the first
state. The dilemma appears to be that there is virtually no authority for
the contrary position, and while the Institute has never been slavish in its
head count of jurisdictions and is quick to discern a "trend" when logic
and policy support a respectable minority view, it is awkward and even
intellectually dishonest to "restate" a position which goes unendorsed by
the courts. The Reporter notes that
[ilt is not clear how far the principle underlying the effect of
dismissals based on the statute of limitations does or should extend. Should it extend, for example, to a dismissal based on the
statute of frauds if the second jurisdiction has a different statute
that would lead to a different result? Neither authority nor policy
lends firm support to nonpreclusion in such a case. Indeed, nonpreclusion seems questionable even with respect to the statute of
limitations. Such statutes may be much more closely related to
the validity of the claim itself than to the competence or appropriateness of the particular court. . . See also the statement in
Bertha Bldg. Corp. v. National Theaters Corp., 248 F.2d 833,
840 (2d Cir. 1957), to the effect that the prevailing rule on the
statute of limitations is inconsistent with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41 (b) .90
The exceptions recommended to the general rule of bar are in
general familiar.91 A judgment based on a dilatory plea is no bar, 92 a
position elsewhere made explicit in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(b). And, unless local court rules otherwise mandate, the plaintiff
application is to different statutes of limitations.

SECOND RESTATEMENT § 48, Comment

f.
87. FniST REsTATEmmNT § 49, Comment a.
88. See note 78 supra and accompanying text.
89. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 95, Comment c (limitations) and § 110 (public policy), cited in SECOND RESTATEMmNT § 48, Comment f.
90. SECOND REsTATEmENT § 48, Reporter's Note.
91. The exceptions are now collected in SEcoND RErATE mNT § 48.1, largely derived from former sections 49, 53 & 54.
92. SECOND RESTATEMENT § 48.1(1)(a), fully in accord with the less specific
former section 49 and its Comment a.
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may elect a voluntary nonsuit without prejudice or the court may permit
one. 3 Federal Rule 41(a) and similar state pronouncements control in
terms the preclusive effects of certain types of judgments (such as
successive voluntary nonsuits) 4 and are accommodated by the 1973
draft. 5
A final exception to the application of bar, while not new, contains
some new blood. It remains the Institute's view that dismissal of a
plaintiff's claim for prematurity or for failure to satisfy a precondition to
suit does not bar a later action when the claim has matured or the
precondition has been executed. 6 The new element is simply an
exception to an exception allowing the earlier judgment to bar a later
suit, basically where the precondition was easily met yet inexcusably
omitted and fairness to the defendant, after all the raison d'etre of the
rule of bar, demands preclusion. 7
COUNTERCLAIMS

There is some reluctance to expatiate on the interplay of counterclaims, defenses, and preclusions. First, statutes and rules of court
control such a great percentage of the cases that it is a rare lawyer who
will have to consult the new Restatement. It is not the assertion of a
counterclaim and concomitant judgment thereon, either favorable or
not, which presents problems, for with an ever less important exception,
both Restatements agree that the general rules of merger and bar
98
apply.
The difficulty is with the failure of a defendant to interpose a
counterclaim when he is permitted to do so. Both the 1942 and 1973
drafts provide that absent a compulsory counterclaim rule or statute, 9 9
a defendant has the right to opt between interposing a counterclaim or
Further,
bringing his own, separate action against the plaintiff.'
93.
94.
95.
96.

SECOND RESTATEMENT § 48.1 (1)(b).
E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a).
SECOND RESTATEMENT § 48.1(1)(c), Comment j, § 48.1(1)(b), Comment f.
Compare FrsT RESTATEMENT § 54 ("condition precedent") with SECOND RE-

STATEMENT § 48.1(2).

97. SECOND RESTATEMENT § 48.1(2), Comment n, Illustration 9.
98. Compare FiRST RESTATEMENT § 56 with SECOND RESTATEMENT § 56. The exception, inability of the court to grant the counterclaimant the full recovery to which
he is entitled, is the subject of new section 56(2) and is carried over from the more
specialized former sections 57 and 60.
99. The compulsory counterclaim exception to the general rule of nonpreclusion is
explicitly set out in new section 56.1(2) (a), receiving analogous, albeit tangential, treatment in former section 58, Comment f.
100. Compare FEmsT RESTATEMENT § 58, Comment a with SECOND RESTATEMENT §
56.1(1).
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refusal to defend on grounds which might be asserted as a counterclaim
has generally no effect on the defendant's claim. But may a defendant
use as a defense to the plaintiff's action facts which could form the basis
of a counterclaim and yet later bring an action on the same facts qua
claim? This is the famous problem of the shield and the sword: 0 1 may
a party use the same congeries of fact first defensively and then in a later
action offensively? Both Restatements say he may, so long as the first
10 2
use is purely defensive.
The innovation in the later Restatement is this: it has carved out a
category of counterclaims which, even if not asserted, must be precluded
in order to insure the integrity of the earlier judgment.103 The Reporter
has for want of an available term called these "common-law compulsory
counterclaims,"' 1 4 hastening to add that while in most cases they will be
"statutory counterclaims" as well, the intended scope of the concept is
much more restricted. It is not sufficient that the counterclaim arise out
of the same transaction or occurrence, the normal trigger of a statutory
compulsory counterclaim, it must actually claim relief which would in
effect be an attack on the first judgment:
The counterclaim must be such that its successful prosecution in
a subsequent action would nullify the [first] judgment, for example,
by allowing the defendant to enjoin enforcement of the judgment,
or to recover on a restitution theory the amount paid pursuant to
the judgment . . . or by depriving the plaintiff in the first action
of property rights vested in him under the first judgment ....
1O5
In any event, if an issue which might have constituted a counterclaim is
actually litigated, reassertion in a subsequent action may be foreclosed
not by these rules of merger and bar, but by collateral estoppel, or issue
preclusion. 10 6
IssuE PRECLUSION

Admirably, the revisers have sifted and sorted the five earlier
101. See Mitchell v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank, 165 S.C. 457, 164 S.E. 136
(1932). "He cannot use the same defence, first as a shield, and then as a sword." Id.
at -, 164 S.E. at 140, quoting Shaw, CJ., in O'Connor v. Varney, 76 Mass. (10 Gray)
231 (1857).
102. Compare FIRsT RESTATEmENT § 58, Comment d and Illustration 11 thereto with
SECOND RESTATEmENT § 56.1, Comment d.
103. SECOND RESTATEMENT § 56.1(b), Comment f.
104. SECOND RESTATEMENT, Reporter's Note.
105. SECOND R.ESTATEMENT § 56.1(2) (b), Comment f.
106. As to issue preclusion of defenses and counterclaims see SECOND RESTATEmENT

§ 56.1, Comment c, Frst RESTATEumNT § 58, Comment c, and text accompanying notes
107-53 infra.
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sections 0 7 dealing with issue preclusion-direct and collateral estoppel
-and left us with two new sections, a short general rule and a considerably longer body of exceptions. 0 8 The new rule is not markedly different from the old:
When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination: is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.'0 9
Two modifications are, however, immediately apparent in the black
letter text: first, the general rule is expressly made applicable to issues
"of law," and second, direct as well as collateral estoppel is brought
within the ambit of the general statement." 0 In spirit the title on issue
preclusion is much altered, and one must consult the exceptions and
comments to discover the manifold differences.
For lack of a better starting place, let us take up the question: as to
what sort of question should relitigation be precluded? One must look
in several places for the answer. Is the matter in the second action
sufficiently related to the matter in the first action that in fairness to the
nonmoving party it can be said to have been already determined? In a
sense, the Institute sidesteps the question, taking a pragmatic rather than
a conceptualistic approach, and suggesting guidelines to help the courts
in what it proposes should be a case-by-case determination."' A total
identity is by no means expected. The commentary of the Second
Restatement does not deal with the "separable facts doctrine" developed
in tax litigation-that total identity of issues is required" 2 -and the
thrust of the section and the Reporter's Note is clearly contrary to the
doctrine. Once a substantial identity of issue is shown, the burden
107. FOLsT RESTATEMENT §§ 68-72.
108. SEcoND RESTATEMENT §§ 68 (general rule), 68.1 (exceptions).
109. SEcOND RESTATEMENT § 68.
110. As a practical matter principles of issue preclusion can usually be applied with.
out discrimination between direct and collateral estoppel, except as to issues of law,
where a direct estoppel may be fairer, and hence more frequent, than a collateral estop.
pel. See SECoND RESTATEMENT § 68, Comment b, § 68.1(b) (i), and text accompanying
notes 128-30 infra.
111. SECOND RESTATEMENT § 68, Comment c. The suggested considerations are:
Is there a substantial overlap between the evidence or argument to be advanced
in the second proceeding and that advanced in the first? Does the new evidence
or argument involve application of the same rule of law as that involved in
the prior proceeding? Could pretrial preparation and discovery relating to
the matter presented in the first action reasonably be expected to have embraced
the matter sought to be presented in the second? How closely related are the
claims involved in the two proceedings?
112. See Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948).
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should be upon the losing party in the first action to prove such changed
118

circumstances as to warrant nonpreclusion.
Having determined that there exists a substantial identity of issues
unfortunately leaves only one hurdle behind us. The First Restatement

denied preclusion of "merely evidentiary facts"'1 4 and in a rare substantive amendment in 1948, extended this exemption to "merely evidentiary or mediate facts,"" 0 accepting Learned Hand's formula that preclusion should only be given to "facts in issue" or ultimate data. 10 The

current Restatement rejects both views in favor of a test which reduces
to recognition and foreseeability. Did the parties and the adjudicator in
the first action recognize the issue as an important one worth full

investigation and litigation, and was it foreseeable that the issue might
7
arise again in subsequent litigation?"1
It must be clear by now that what is to be precluded is inexorably
tied to what was "actually litigated," an emphatic pleonasm which the
reporter notes but leaves untouched"18 in order to stress the importance
of assuring the existence of prior litigation before precluding disputation
of an issue."19 The discussion of the requirement tracks closely the
earlier text,' 20 but emphasizes that "litigation" does not always mean
"trial" and that determination on the pleadings or summary judgments
can meet the requirement in appropriate instances. Both Restatements

permit preclusion of issues determined in equity in later actions at
law,' 2 ' the latter redaction specifically rejecting as a general principle of
estoppel an opinion of a United States court of appeals which denied
preclusion when the effect was to eliminate a jury determination of the
issue.' 22
113. SEcoND REsTATEMENT § 68, Comment c, Reporter's Note. Contrast the burden
which is placed upon the party attempting to establish "actual litigation." Id., Comment
f.
114. FiRST RESTATEMENT § 68, Comment p.
115. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68, Comment p. (Supp. 1948).
116. Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1944). The case, I think, contains
the seeds of its own demise, for Hand's conceptualistic divisions are all geared to a single
practical consideration: foreseeability of prospective collateral preclusion. He remarks,
wistfully obiter:
Were the law to be recast, it would . . . be a pertinent inquiry whether the
conclusiveness . . . of facts decided in the first [suit], might not properly be
limited to future controversies which could be thought reasonably in prospect
when the first suit was tried. That is of course not the law as it stands ....
Id. at 929.
117. SECOND RESTATEMENT H9 68, Comment i, 68.1(e) (ii).
118. See SECOND RESTATEMMNT § 68, Comment e, Reporter's Note.
119. Id., Comment d.
120. Compare FroST REsTATEMENT § 68, Comments c-j.
121. Compare FiRST RE STATEMENT § 68, Comment j, Illustration 4 with SECOND
RESTATEMENT § 68, Comment d.
122. Rachal v. Hill, 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970).
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The requirement of "essentiality"-that determination of the issue
must have been essential to the prior judgment-has experienced at least
one transformation 2 3 of substance: nisi prius determinations in the
alternative either of which standing alone would have supported the
result and justified an estoppel, are now both considered "inessential," a
reversal of the previous view that both could be considered essential and
precluded. 1 24 The change in position must be justified on policy rather
than on logic, since it is hard to say neither was necessary to the
judgment. The grounds given in support of the new rule is that the
right to appeal the determination may be ephemeral, the losing party
fearing that one of the grounds might never be reached in the reviewing
court. Another reason for finding nonpreclusion in such cases is unstated by the Second Restatement. In support of the older view, the current
comment states that "a party who would otherwise urge several matters
in support of a particular result may be deterred from doing so if a
judgment resting on alternative determinations does not effectively preclude relitigation of particular issues."' 2' 5 It occurs to me the converse
is as true: if one routinely precludes alternative issues when it is not
known which is at bottom the one which supports the judgment, a party
may be chary of putting any even arguably unnecessary eggs in the trial
basket. The new rule effectively protects litigants, gives them freedom
to put forward whichever issues they choose, and allows relitigation only
when the adjudicator, maybe out of doubt or fear of reversal, makes
preclusion
alternative determinations. The policies which support issue
26
instance.
an
such
in
relitigation
of
denial
give no support to
Even when all the normal prerequisites to issue preclusion are
present, there may be reasons for permitting relitigation. The Second
12 7
Restatement suggests, in a single section, five such circumstances.
There is much new matter, but little room for catchy titles or simplistic
descriptions: the 1973 drafters, like those before them, realize that
there are numerous instances in which collateral and direct estoppels
overstep their worth.
123. That evidentiary and mediate data are now considered "essential" and their relitigation precluded has already been noted. See text accompanying notes 114-17 supra.
124. Compare SECOND RESTATEMENT § 68, Comment i with FmsT R:ESTATEMENT §
68, Comment n and Illustrations 7 & 8. Note that the 1942 illustrations both deal with
alternative defenses, where the problem is most likely to arise.
125. SECOND RESTATEMENT § 68, Comment i.
126. Contrast the rule on appeal, where the reviewing court affirms on alternative
grounds, in which case both Restatements agree there should be dual preclusion. See
FrST RESTATEMENT § 69(1), Comments a & b; SECOND RESTATEMENT § 68, Comment
0.

127. SECOND

RESATEmENT

§ 68.1, replacing former sections 69-72.
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As to issues of law 2 s both Restatements evidence a preference for
the more flexible rules of stare decisis over the more Procrustean tenets
of res judicata. A rule of law declared in a proceeding between suitors
ought not bind them on all claims forever. Hence estoppel is denied
where
[t]he issue is one of law and (i) the two actions involve claims
that are substantially unrelated, or (ii) a new determination is
warranted in order to take account of an intervening change in
the applicable legal context or otherwise to avoid inequitable administration of the laws ...
129
I suggest the key -to the application of the section is much the same as
the considerations involved under section 56.1 concerning when an
omitted counterclaim may be asserted in an independent action: preclude relitigation if the new action is fundamentally an attack on the
former judgment.' 30
Two more broadly drafted versions of an earlier exception have
been retained, with some anticipated differences in result:
(c) A new determination of the issue is warranted by differences
in the quality or extensiveness of the procedures followed in
the two courts or by factors relating to the allocation of jurisdiction between them; or
(d) The party against whom preclusion is sought had a significantly heavier burden of persuasion with respect to the issue
in the initial action than in the subsequent action; the burden has shifted to his adversary; or -theadversary has a significantly heavier burden than he had in the first action .... 181
The newer version would deny preclusion even in the courts of the
same state, where procedural or jurisdictional differences together with a
dose of common sense warrant relitigation. The illustration of a denial
of collateral estoppel on issues decided by an informal small claims court
well underscores the necessity of such a rule. 3 2 As to judgments
incidentally determining title to land in a sister state, the Second Restatement modifies the First and, following the Institute's Restatement (Second) of Conflicts,'33 would estop further litigation. With respect to
state and federal courts, there is scant change largely because the subject
128. SECOND RETATEMENT § 68.1(b), drawn from former section 70.
129. SECOND RESTATEmENT § 68.1(b).
130. See text accompanying notes 103-05 supra.
131. SECOND RESTATEMENT §§ 68.1(c) & (d). See SECOND RESTATEMENT, CoMments d, e, & f. Contrast FiRsT RESTATEMENT § 71.
132. SECOND RETATEMENT § 68.1(c), Comment d, Illustration 7.
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 95 (1971).
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comes laden with constitutional precepts of preclusion.

Often, the

supremacy clause will mandate preclusion in one direction and the

doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction will prevent it in the other.

The

touchstone is obviously federal legislative intent. 3 4
The later text also permits relitigation where differences in the
burden of persuasion make preclusion in the second action inequitable,
a sound exemption apparently overlooked in the 1942 version. 135 Finally, there exists the residuary escape clause which to the surprise of
some is not to be found in the FirstRestatement. 3 This is, I suggest,
explicable by the first volume's embracement of Learned Hand's approach to mediate and ultimate data. In fact, secreted in this final
subsection of exceptions is the entire soul of the new estoppel provisions: "lit was not sufficiently foreseeable at the time of the initial
action that the issue would arise in the context of a subsequent action
"'137

ISSUE PRECLUSION INVOKED BY NONPARTIES
The First Restatement adhered to the principle of mutuality of
estoppel, that in order to invoke a judgment as an estoppel a party must
have been subject, had it been unfavorable, to the same judgment as an
estoppel: "[A] person who is not a party or privy to -aparty to an action
. . . is not bound by or entitled to claim the benefits of an adjudication
upon any matter decided in the action."' 138 The first part of the
statement is doubtless indisputable as a matter of constitutional law, for
current notions of due process require that a person must have an
opportunity to be heard before he can be bound by a judgment, unless
he is represented by a party or has interests derivative from a party. 39
The latter suggestion of the cited section comes devoid of constitutional
implications-a person who has had notice and opportunity to be heard
on an issue can scarcely assert a denial of due process merely because he
is precluded from doing it again. If this notion prevailed, all of the law
of res judicata should crumble at our feet. In the very year of its
promulgation by the Institute, the doctrine of mutuality came under
134. Compare SEcoND

RESrATENENT

§ 68.1(c), Comment e with FRsr

RESTATE-

MENT§ 71, Comment e. The supremacy clause is found at U.S. CON ST. art. VI, § 2.
135. ScoND REATEMmNT § 68.1(d), Comment f.
136. Id. § 68.1(e).
137. Id. § 68.1(e)(ii).
138. FnsT RESTATEMENT § 93.
139. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402
U.S. 313, 329 (1971).
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attack from the Supreme Court of California in the celebrated case of
Bernhardv. Bank of America.140 It was a mortal blow. The Supreme
Court of the United States has overruled the requirement of mutuality of
estoppel in patent infringement cases,1" 4 ' and while the doctrine still
gasps here and there, the Second Restatement has pronounced it
dead. 4' It places in its stead the general rule that a party who would
have been precluded under sections 68 and 68.1 (collateral and direct
estoppel) from relitigating an issue with a party opponent will likewise
be precluded from doing so with another person (often somewhat
confusingly called a nonparty), "unless [the party] lacked full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action or unless other
circumstances justify affording him an opportunity to relitigate the
issue.' 148
The general proposition is then hedged, as we have seen elsewhere
in the Second Restatement, with a series not of conceptualistic restraints
but of pragmatic safeguards. All of the exceptions to the general rule
of collateral estoppel among parties form a first line of defense for the
party, assuring him a right to relitigate against the stranger any issue he
might still dispute with his first opponent. 44 The second line of
defense is found in seven safeguards, or if you will, exceptions. It may
be that we shall have to await a third Restatement before we can better
describe these safeguards, but for the present the following summary
may do service.
Where the substantive law and its scheme of remedies evinces an
intent that reitigation be available, naturally the law of judgments
should be no barrier. 14r Moreover, where the second forum offers
significantly different procedural opportunities for determination of the
issue with some reasonable likelihood that the differences might alter the
1 40
result, then fairness and the Second Restatement allow reassertion.
140. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
141. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation,
402 U.S.313 (1971).
142. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDoMENTS § 88, Comment b & Reporter's
Note (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975).
143. Id. § 88 (emphasis added).
144. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JuDGMENTs § 88 & Comment b (Tent. Draft No.
2, 1975), both of which incorporate expressly SECOND RESTATEMENT § 68.1.
145. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JuVDMENiS § 88(1), Comment c (Tent. Draft No.
2, 1975).
146. Id. § 88(2), Comment d. This is the case of Rachal v. Hill, 435 F.2d 59 (5th
Cir. 1970). As between the same parties, one will recall, the Restatement would preclude relitigation. Where a nonparty asserts estoppel, however, the Restatement would
allow, but does not require, relitigation.
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This is, after all, but a corollary to the similar exception for same-party
estoppel. 147 Perhaps the most interesting exception is that which permits relitigation where the party seeking the benefit of the estoppel
offensively-that is, trying to use it to gain affirmative relief-appears
to have manipulated joinder so as to have the benefit of a favorable
judgment without the risk of an adverse one. 148 Herein, however, arises
the "anomaly" of the mass tort which so worried Brainerd Currie but to
which he later resigned himself;149 the Second Restatement permits a
co-claimant to "sit this one out," and await in hope a judgment in favor
of one of his fellows.'1 0 Many have objected to this "anomaly" as being
unfair to the defendant, an objection I consign as did Bentham to the
mentality of the gaming table. I rather feel some regret for those first
few plaintiffs who recovered naught and whose claims are now forfeited
by bar. Perhaps, though, their "remedy" is to sue as representatives of
a class under Federal Rule 23 or a state cognate.
Three remaining exceptions to nonparty estoppel are the children
of suspicion: one ought not preclude litigation over an issue which has
been inconsistently adjudicated before.'"' Neither Reporter's Note nor
the Comment reflects the possibility that this exception might be used to
defeat "offensive!' use of a finding in the mass tort situation. The
remaining codifications of suspicion 52 allow relitigation where cause
exists to believe that the first judgment may have resulted in part from
the relationship of the parties (such as relative financial position), from
a compromise verdict, or where circumstances simply make relitigation
more appropriate than preclusion.
Perhaps the final, concluding sentence of the Reporter's Note to
this section states a principle as valuable for all res judicata as it is for
nonparty estoppel: "The ultimate question is whether there is good
reason, all things considered, to allow the party to relitigate the issue.,,51

147. See note 132 supra and accompanying text.
148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88(3), Comment e.

149. Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9
STAN. L. REv. 281 (1957); Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L.
R . 25 (1965).
150. REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF JUmmNTs § 88(3), Reporter's Note (Tent. Draft
No. 2, 1975).
151. Id.§ 88(4).
152. Id.§§ 88(5) & 88(7).
153. Id.§ 88, Reporter's Note.
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